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he economic policies of China and India are enormously important, not only to the 
citizens of these two populous countries but increasingly to the vitality of the global 
economy. Both countries have abandoned Soviet-style central planning and are now 
decentralizing economic decision making by pursuing market-oriented reforms and 
T
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devolving fiscal functions to local governments. In 1994, China reformed its tax system by 
assigning taxes to the central government and creating a national tax administration to 
collect taxes assigned to the central government. In contrast, in 1991, India tried to 
revitalize its economy by deregulating its economy and, in 1992, further decentralizing its 
fiscal system from state to local governments. 
The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the design and performance of China 
and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. We pay particular attention to the fiscal 
effects of changes to their respective intergovernmental systems. Performance is measured 
by the overall and average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization and the 
interregional variation in the average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization. To this 
end, we make use of a unique dataset on the fiscal operations of the central and sub-national 
governments of both countries for the period 1985 through 2005. Our comparative analysis 
seeks to identify strengths and weaknesses in China and India’s fiscal systems. To the best 
of our knowledge, no quantitative comparison of China and India’s fiscal systems has been 
undertaken so far, making this study the first of its kind.1  
There is a large theoretical literature describing the advantages of fiscal decentralization. In 
his seminal article, Tiebout (1956) shows that many competing jurisdictions seeking to 
attract residents and a mobile population ready to move to the jurisdiction offering the best 
tax-expenditure bundle can lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the local public 
sector. Oates (1972) contends that, in the absence of scale economies and inter-
jurisdictional spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods is always superior in 
terms of economic efficiency to centralized and therefore uniform provision of local public 
goods. 
According to Buchanan (1976), differences in the benefits and costs of providing 
government services—henceforth net fiscal residuals—across regions may induce migration 
from regions with low net fiscal residuals to regions with high net fiscal residuals. As 
people move in response to differences in net fiscal residuals, the cost of providing a 
constant level of local public goods increases due to increased congestion of local public 
goods, and, as people leave regions with low net fiscal residuals, the cost of providing a 
constant level of local public goods decreases due to decreased congestion of local public 
goods. Thus, in Buchanan’s model, differences in net fiscal residuals among the regions of 
a country induce migration which, in turn, eliminates interregional differences in net fiscal 
residuals. In equilibrium, there is no incentive for people to move from one region to 
another. 
One potential drawback of the Tiebout-Oates-Buchanan model of fiscal decentralization, 
particularly in the context of China and India, is the assumption of a highly mobile 
population moving in response to differences in net fiscal residuals among regions of a 
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country. This assumption applies to very few countries. It certainly does not apply to 
traditional societies, like those of China and India, where people have strong attachments to 
particular localities due to local customs, local languages, and ethnic fractionalization. In 
such circumstances, elimination of net fiscal residuals among the regions of a country with 
relatively immobile populations can only be achieved by purposeful central government 
policies to transfer resources to local governments. In the absence of intergovernmental 
equalization transfers, large interregional discrepancies can emerge in the quantity and 
quality of local government service provision. The risk is that growing fiscal disparities can 
jeopardize social cohesion and political stability. 
Indeed, there is concern that growing interregional disparities within both countries are 
weakening national cohesion and solidarity. Spahn (2007) points out that achieving social 
cohesion and a sense of national identity is particularly challenging in these two large 
countries. Political unrest and regional separatist tendencies are on-going concerns. 
Consequently, there is a need for centripetal policies, such as equalizing transfers, to help 
address the concerns of aggrieved ethno-linguistic minorities and other potential 
secessionists. 
Another potential drawback of the Tiebout-Oates-Buchanan model is that it is too 
simplistic. In their model, many jurisdictions competing for residents and a mobile 
population willing to move in response to differences in net fiscal residuals is sufficient to 
achieve allocative efficiency in the public sector. In other words, “voting with your feet” 
serves as an accountability mechanism that assures fiscal discipline and efficient resource 
allocation by local governments. However, in mature federal countries, there are multiple 
accountability mechanisms that promote efficiency and fiscal discipline among local 
governments. One such accountability mechanism is popularly elected local government 
officials. If the residents of a jurisdiction are unhappy with the performance of their local 
government, they can vote the “bums out.” In fact, Stigler (1957) contends that 
representative democracy works best when government is closest to the people. In his view 
fiscal decentralization strengthens the democratic process. However, voting as an 
accountability mechanism works best when there are competing political parties, and people 
vote according to their interests rather than strictly according to ethnic or caste affiliations. 
Another important accountability mechanism is allowing local governments to go to the 
market to borrow the necessary funds to finance capital expenditures. A local government 
that is living within its means is able to borrow at lower costs than a local government that 
is living beyond its means. Thus, the quest for high bond ratings and thus lower interest 
payments on local debt obligations creates strong financial incentives for local governments 
to achieve and maintain fiscal discipline. Finally, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, 
and a vibrant civil society, particularly freedom of the press, are also important 
accountability mechanisms in mature democracies. 
Even with all of these accountability mechanisms in place, however, there is still significant 
waste, fraud, and inefficiency among local governments in many mature federal countries. 
4
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One only has to look at the substandard performance of public schools in the United States 
to realize that a federal system with an array of accountability mechanisms does not ensure 
efficient resource allocation in the public sector.2   
Since many of these accountability mechanisms are missing in China and India, they must 
rely on vertical accountability mechanisms, like audits. However, vertical accountability 
mechanisms often are vulnerable to political manipulation. Thus, to gauge the performance 
of a given fiscal system, it is important to look not only at its design but also to look at 
empirical measures of its performance. 
We find that there are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and 
India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems. More specifically, compared to the international 
average, both countries have highly decentralized expenditure assignments and fairly 
centralized revenue assignments, making local governments reliant on central government 
transfers to finance their responsibilities. In addition, sub-national governments in both 
countries engage in off-the-books and hidden borrowing. We also find that there are 
considerable and growing disparities in the rates of expenditure decentralization among 
sub-national governments within both countries. Lack of fiscal discipline and growing fiscal 
disparities among sub-national governments create risks to future economic growth and to 
social cohesion, in the absence of policy reforms to address these issues. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes China and 
India’s fiscal systems. Section 3 discusses the performance of their respective systems, and 
section 4 concludes. 
A Description of China and India’s Fiscal Systems 
A convenient way to organize the following discussion of China and India’s fiscal systems 
is to describe the pillars of their intergovernmental fiscal systems, namely the expenditure 
assignments, revenue assignments, system of intergovernmental transfers, and regulation of 
subnational borrowing. We proceed below by describing the pillars of China’s fiscal 
system, with special emphasis on the 1994 tax sharing system (TSS) reforms (fenshui zhi).3  
We also briefly explain China’s system of extra-budgetary finance. Then, we turn to a 
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China’s fiscal system 
China is a unitary country with five hierarchically arranged levels of government, 
comprised of one central government; 34 provincial level governments, including 22 
provinces, five autonomous regions, four municipalities directly under the central 
government, and two special administrative regions, namely Hong Kong after 1997, Macao 
after 1999, and the claimed province of Taiwan. There are about 333 prefectures, including 
autonomous prefectures and cities divided into districts; 2,856 counties, including 
autonomous counties, small cities not divided into districts, districts within large cities; and 
40,906 townships. 
The recent evolution of China’s fiscal system has been a gradual movement in the direction 
of greater fiscal decentralization. In 1978, fiscal reforms started with the devolution of 
resources and decision-making power to sub-national governments and state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). Although these initiatives provided sub-national governments with 
incentives to develop their local economies, the uncontrolled decentralization and case-by-
case bargaining between the central and sub-national governments led to a sharp decline in 
central government revenues. 
Figure 1 (China): The Share of Consolidated General Government Revenue in GDP, 















      
      Source: National Statistics Bureau, China 
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More specifically, as shown in Figure 1, consolidated government revenues dropped from 
slightly more than 20 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to approximately 10 
percent of GDP, between 1985 and 1993. Meanwhile, the central government’s share of 
revenues dropped from 38.4 percent of consolidated revenues to 22 percent. These trends 
were the result of the proliferation of tax exemptions granted to local state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the shifting of taxes by sub-national governments from budgetary to 
extra-budgetary accounts. Prior to the 1994 TSS reforms, local governments collected the 
major share of domestic taxes, and transferred the central government’s share of local taxes 
to the central government. By moving revenues off-budget, local governments were able to 
retain a greater share of local revenues. As discussed in greater detail below, the decline in 
the two-ratios – the decline in consolidated revenues as a share of GDP and the decline in 
the central government’s share of consolidated government revenues - led the central 
government to initiate the 1994 TSS reforms with a view to re-centralize revenues.  
The first pillar: China’s expenditure assignments 
Table 1 summarizes China’s current expenditure assignments. Many expenditure 
responsibilities are shared by the central government and sub-national governments, 
including social security, education, medical services, public health, and economic 
development. Although statutorily China’s expenditure assignments involve extensive 
concurrent expenditure responsibilities, sub-national governments accounted for more than 
74 percent of consolidated expenditures in 2005 as opposed to 47.5 percent in 1984. The 
system of expenditure assignments is on the whole unchanged since the initiation of 
economic reforms in 1978. A heavy burden of providing basic public services rests largely 
on sub-national governments. More specifically, 98 percent of health expenditures were 
shouldered by sub-national governments in 2007. Furthermore, the politically centralized 
system makes it easy for the central government to shift expenditures to sub-national 
governments, although, as we will see below, major revenues have been recentralized since 
enactment of the 1994 TSS reforms. 
The second pillar: China’s revenue assignments 
As summarized in Table 2, the central government is assigned the major share of the broad-
based and productive taxes. Taxes exclusively assigned to sub-national governments are 
low-yielding taxes, such as slaughter taxes. Meanwhile, the 1994 TSS reforms divided tax 
administration into two systems: the National Tax Service (NTS) and the Local Tax Service 
(LTS). The NTS is responsible for the collection of exclusively central taxes and all shared 
taxes. The LTS collects exclusively local taxes. As a result of this clear-cut division of 
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responsibility of the 
central government 
National defense  100  0 100  0 
Foreign affairs, aid and debt service  100  0 100  0 
International trade policies  100  0 100  0 
National fiscal and monetary policies  100  0 100  0 
National infrastructure  100  0 100  0 
Operation of the central government and  
central judicial organs 
 100  0 100  0 
National projects  100  0 100  0 
Technical renovation, research and 
development by central SOEs 
 100  0 100  0 
Macroeconomic control, coordination 
among regions, redistribution like transfers 
among regions 




Local parks, recreation, fire safety and 
other local public services  
 0 100  0   100 
Sub-national projects, infrastructure and 
housing 
 0 100  0   100 
Technical renovation, research and 
development by sub-national  SOEs 
 0 100  0   100 
Operation of sub-national governments and  
sub-national judicial organs 
 0 100  0   100 
Sub-national water, power, sewage, waste 
disposal and welfare 
 0 100  0   100 
Concurrent 
responsibility 
Expenses on economic development such 
as capital investment and accumulation 
69 31 69 31 
Education and culture  11 89 7 93 
Public health and sanitation 49 51 2 98 
Science and technology 33 67 52 48 
Social security such as pensions and 
unemployment insurance 
1 99 6 94 
Subsidies on agriculture and others 10 90 9 91 
Public security 25 75 17 83 
Expenditures on industry, transportation 
and commerce including environmental 
protection, urban maintenance and 
construction 
32 68 34 66 
Administration expenses 8 92 25 75 
Interest payments on debts 100 0 94 6 
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Customs duties  100 0  100 0 
Value added taxes and excise taxes on 
imports 
 100  0  100  0 
Tax reimbursements for export of foreign 
trade businesses 





Urban maintenance & construction taxes 
(other than from railways corporations, 
banks, & non-bank financial institutions like 
insurance businesses) 
0  100  0  100  
Vehicle and vessel sales, use taxes  0 100 0 100 
Profit remittances from sub-national SOEs 0 100 0 100 
Real estate taxes in urban and township areas 
and land use-related taxes 
0 100 0 100 
Stamp taxes other than those on security  0 100 0 100 
Deed taxes 0 100 0 100 
Fixed asset investment regulation taxes 
(suspended in 2000) 
0 100 0 100 
Banquet taxes (mostly abolished in 2002) 0 100 n.a. n.a. 
Agricultural taxes (abolished in 2005) 0 100 n.a. n.a. 









Value Added Taxes (VAT) 12 88 75 25 
Product / Excise taxes  57 43 100 0 
Corporate Income Taxes (CIT) 78 22 64 36 
Personal Income Taxes (PIT) 0 100 60 40 
Business taxes 8 92 3 97 
Stamp taxes on security transaction 50 50 97 3 
Agricultural sector taxes  8 92 97 3 
Other taxes n.a.  n.a.  20 80 
Actual tax 
shares 
Tax revenues 21 79 58 42 
Non-tax revenues 98 2 24 76 
Total revenues 33 67 54 46 
Source: Jin (2009, p. 63).  
Notes:  
(1) CIT in 1993 refers to SOEs only.  
(2) The product taxes were replaced by excise taxes/consumption tax in 1994.  
(3) Taxes on the agricultural sector include husbandry tax, contract tax, special agricultural product taxes, 
arable land use tax and other agriculture-related taxes and charges. 
 
The three bottom rows of Table 2 show actual tax and non-tax revenue shares in total 
revenues by level of government before and after the TSS reforms. In 1993, before the TSS 
9
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reforms, the share of sub-national tax revenues in total revenues was 79 percent, with the 
remaining 21 percent of revenue accruing to the central government. However, in 2007, the 
situation was reversed: the central government share of total revenues was 58 percent, with 
the remaining 42 percent accruing to sub-national governments. This re-centralization of 
revenues is mainly the result of the 1994 TSS reforms. As a result, the percentage of shared 
tax revenues in consolidated tax revenues increased from 55 percent in 1994 to 70 percent 
in 2005. As a result of the 1994 TSS reforms, the previously poor inland provinces became 
even worse off in terms of revenue capacity because their limited own revenues were 
centralized. This revenue centralization makes them even more dependent on central 
transfers as well as on hidden sub-national borrowings. 
In the case of China, there exists another critical source of finance. That is off-budget 
finance, which exists at both the central and sub-national levels of government. Off-budget 
finance consists mainly of extra-budgetary funds together with user fees and various levies. 
Off-budget finance by sub-national governments is under the full discretion of sub-national 
governments. The size of extra-budgetary funds grew rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, 
finally becoming equivalent in size to budgetary funds in 1991.4  As a result of several 
policy reforms associated with the 1994 TSS reforms, which shifted extra-budgetary funds 
to budgetary funds, extra-budgetary funds began to decline.5  In 2005, extra-budgetary 
expenditures dropped to about 16 percent of budgetary expenditures. Since the taxes 
associated with off-budget funds are levied on the same tax base as budget funds, off-
budget funds, like extra-budgetary revenues, are positively related to own source revenues, 
which is an important source of interregional disparities in per capita provincial 
expenditures.6  
The third pillar: China’s system of intergovernmental transfers 
A fiscal system, like China’s, with highly centralized revenues and highly decentralized 
expenditures makes sub-national governments dependent on intergovernmental transfers to 
fill the gap between their expenditure responsibilities and revenue capacity. In 2005, 
transfers from the central government to sub-national governments accounted for 57 percent 
of total central government expenditures and 46 percent of sub-national revenues, including 
extra-budget accounts.  
The current transfer system was introduced in China by the 1994 TSS reforms. There are 
three types of central government transfers to sub-national governments: tax rebates, 
general-purpose grants, and special-purpose grants. Tax rebates are distributed on a 
derivation basis to address the political opposition of high-income sub-national 
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governments to the TSS reforms. Accordingly, tax rebates conflict with the equalization 
goal of the TSS reforms. To achieve greater horizontal fiscal equalization, the share of tax 
rebates was decreased from 75 percent in 1994 to 19 percent in 2008; whereas the share of 
general purpose grants increased from 4 to 38 percent during the same period. Special-
purpose grants compromise a third type of intergovernmental transfer and are intended to 
realize specific objectives of the central government. The share of special-purpose grants in 
total transfers also increased from 21 percent in 1994 to 43 percent in 2008. 
The fourth pillar: China’s regulation of sub-national borrowing autonomy 
Although sub-national governments are prohibited from borrowing except upon special 
approval of the central government, almost all sub-national governments are circumventing 
these restrictions by borrowing “off the books.” Qiao and Shah (2006) describe the channels 
of local government borrowings. Examples include borrowing from local commercial banks 
by enterprises controlled by sub-national governments, such as local SOEs, with local 
government guarantees; establishment of new companies through collective financing by 
local governments or employees of local SOEs; borrowing from pension funds, 
unemployment insurance funds, or government employee salary funds; borrowing from 
extra-budgetary funds, and so on. Interestingly, these sub-national borrowings are having an 
equalizing effect on per capita provincial expenditures. The risk, however, is that 
uncontrolled and hidden borrowing by sub-national governments may lead to 
macroeconomic instability. 
 
India’s fiscal system 
India is a federal republic comprising five levels of government: the central government 
(the Union), 28 states, seven union territories (the states), including the National Capital 
Territory of Delhi, and three tiers of local government. In rural areas, the three tiers of local 
government consist of about 610 districts (Zilla Parishads), 6,000 blocks (Samiti 
Panchayats), and 250,000 villages (Gram Panchayats), and in urban areas, municipal 
corporations, municipalities, and councils constitute the third-tier of local government.7  
India has a parliamentary system of government in which the prime minister, as the head of 
the central government and the cabinet, are chosen by the party or party coalition that wins 
a majority of votes. Compared to the leader-subordinate relationship in the center-provincial 
framework of China, the executive officers of the Union government of India and those of 
the state governments are accountable, first, to the corresponding legislatures and, second, 
to the voters, though a guiding administrative relation exists among the tiers of government. 
It is the legislative power that dominates in this institutional framework. 
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Since its foundation in 1947 up to the early 1990s, India was a two-tier federation with a 
constitutional demarcation of responsibilities and finances between the Union and the state 
governments, which have separate legislative, executive, and judicial organs of governing. 
Fiscal decentralization did not go beyond the state level until the 1992 constitutional 
amendments granting statutory recognition to the third-tier governments in rural and urban 
areas, although these local self-governing bodies existed long before 1947. 
Only after 1992 did local governments gain constitutional status and federal recognition 
with the 73rd and 74th Constitution amendments granting more powers and fiscal resources 
to local governments and limiting state government interference in local, democratic self-
governance. The 11th schedule of the Constitution assigns 29 expenditure items to rural 
bodies, and the 12th schedule assigns 18 expenditure items to urban local bodies. However, 
as Rao and Singh (1999) point out, several institutional failures—including a clear 
centripetal bias in the distribution of fiscal powers, overlapping tax bases in contrast to the 
separation principle of tax powers, and constitutionally endorsed taxation of inter-state 
trade—have resulted in many economic distortions that may hinder genuine fiscal 
decentralization and the development of a common market. 
Before the 1980s, fiscal centralization dominated the national economy. Beginning in the 
mid-1980s, fiscal decentralization was the focus for revitalizing the economy. Fiscal 
decentralization, together with other economic reforms, has brought about high fiscal 
deficits and high debts as well as large economic growth rates. The consolidated gross fiscal 
deficit of the central and state governments increased from 7.4 percent of GDP in 1980 to 
9.4 percent of GDP in 1990. The combined outstanding liabilities of the central and state 
governments increased from 54 percent of GDP in 1984 to 67 percent in 1990. The 
economic reforms initiated in the 1980s did not change the fundamental fiscal framework. 
Driven by the fiscal deficit and debt crisis in the early 1990s, the Government of India 
began a process of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of the economy, together 
with a broadening of the tax base, compressing expenditures, and strengthening state fiscal 
discipline with the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill in 2000. The new 
round of economic reforms has resulted in a lower fiscal deficit to GDP ratio as well as 
remarkably higher annual rates of economic growth. As a result, the combined central and 
state gross fiscal deficit was reduced from 9.4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 6.7 percent of 
GDP in 2005, although high outstanding liabilities remain, particularly at the state level.  
The first pillar: India’s expenditure assignments 
Expenditure assignments, as provided for in Article 246 of the Constitution (also known as 
the Seventh Schedule), have three clear lists that specify all functions exclusively assigned 
to the Union government (List I - Union List), exclusively to the state governments (List II - 
State List), and concurrent assignments (List III - Concurrent List). Table 3 shows the 
statutory expenditure assignments. The murkiness lies in the concurrent responsibilities in 
List III, in which the role of the states is unclear. A large share of state revenues is used to 
cover recurrent expenditures, such as administrative services, payroll, pensions, and interest 
12
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on loans. Among total sub-national expenditures, the share devoted to non-development 
expenditures increased from less than 19 percent in 1980 to 34 percent in 2005. In the 
meantime, over 60 percent of agricultural services and nearly 90 percent of educational, 
public health, family welfare, electricity, and irrigation expenditures are shouldered by state 
governments. 
 The second pillar: India’s revenue assignments 
Table 4 summarizes India’s revenue assignments, as provided for by the three lists of the 
Seventh Schedule. The most productive taxes are assigned to the Union for the purpose of 
macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution. At the same time, the states are assigned a 
number of tax handles. However, from the viewpoint of productivity and buoyancy, only 
the sales and purchase taxes are important. Since the 80th Amendment to the Constitution 
in 2000, the net proceeds of all Union taxes and duties have been changed to shared taxes 
between the Union and states. Further, the 88th Amendment to the Constitution in 2003 
includes taxes on services in List I as shared revenues with the states. 
 
Table 3a: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, Union List 
Main Responsibilities Assignments 
National defense and others related to intelligence & forces of the Union 
List I  
Union List 
Foreign affairs, foreign loans & public debts   
International trade, treaties, conferences, and social order on the high seas  
International civil affairs like naturalization, migration, & pilgrimages, etc. 
National fiscal and monetary tools like currency, Reserve Bank of India, Post Office Savings,  
Bank, lotteries, banking, insurance, stock market, future market, & other derivative markets. 
National infrastructures like airways, railways, national highways, national waterways, maritime shipping 
& navigation, lighthouses, ports, posts & telegraphs, telephones, wireless, broadcasting, properties of the 
Union. 
Interstate trade and commerce, intellectual property rights protection 
Establishment of standards of weight and measure; regulation of goods to be exported abroad or interstate 
Natural resources regulation, cultivation, manufacture, and sale for export of opium 
Coordination and standardization of higher education and research 
National heritages and institutions, Union public services, All-India services, Census 
Elections to Parliament and Legislatures of the states, Offices of President   
Operation of the Union government, Parliament and the Union judicial organs 
Audit of the accounts of the Union and the States 
Interstate migration and quarantine 
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List I except the Supreme Court; Any other matter not in List II 
or List III 
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Table 3b: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, Concurrent List 
 
Main Responsibilities Assignments 




Transfer of property other than agricultural land; Many domestic civil laws concerning marriage, family, 
and so on. 
Contracting other than agricultural land; bankruptcy and insolvency, trust and trustees
Administration of justice except the Supreme Court and the High Courts
Vagrancy; nomadic, and migratory tribes; national environment, animal and plants protection 
Economic and social planning including family planning; Commercial and industrial monopolies, 
combines, and trusts 
Trade unions; industrial and labor disputes; charities and religions 
Social security and social insurance, welfare of labor; education and legal, medical, and other professions 
Interstate public health; vital statistics; price control; Mechanically propelled vehicles, factories, boilers, 
electricity, and publishing presses 
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List III except the Supreme Court 
   Source: Jin (2009, p. 72). 
 
Table 3c: India’s Statutory Expenditure Assignments, State List 
 
Main Responsibilities Assignments 
Public order except that subject the control of the Union 
List II 
State List 
Operation of State governments & local governments, the Legislatures of the states, the State judicial and 
correction organs, and elections at the State level
Public goods and services such as public health & sanitation, pilgrimages, social relief, regulation of 
intoxicating liquor, burials & cremations, public libraries & museums, communications not in List I, 
water, land, fisheries, gas, markets & fairs, inns, sports, entertainments, gambling, incorporations other 
than those in List I 
Agriculture, Trade and Commerce within the State 
Public debt of the State, Treasure trove
Jurisdiction and powers of all matters on List II except the Supreme Court 























THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
 
PAGE 566 2011   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG
 
Table 4: India’s Statutory Revenue Assignments 
 
Main tax revenues Assignments 
Taxes on income other than agricultural income
List I- 
Union List 
Duties of customs including export duties 
Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods 
Corporation tax 
Estate duty with respect to property other than agricultural land
Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive to agricultural land
Estate duty with respect to property other than agricultural land
Duties with respect to succession to property other than agricultural land
Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea, or air, on railway fares and 
freights.                       
Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock exchanges and future markets 
letters of credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies, and receipts 
Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on advertisements published 
Taxes on the consignments of interstate goods trade or commerce 
Taxes on services 
Residuary tax powers not specified in List II and III 
Fees in respect of any of the matters in List I 




Stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of judicial stamps 
Fees with respect to any of the matters in List III 
Taxes on agricultural income 
List II- 
State List 
Duties with respect to succession to agricultural land
Estate duty with respect to agricultural land 
Taxes on lands and buildings 
Taxes on mineral rights 
Duties of excise on certain goods manufactured or produced in the state
Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity
Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods except newspapers and advertisements on them
Taxes on advertisements other than advertisements published in the newspapers
Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways
Taxes on vehicles, boats, and animals; tolls 
Taxes on professions, trades, callings, and employment
Capitation taxes 
Taxes on luxuries, entertainment, and gambling
Rates of stamp duty with respect to documents other than those specified in List I
Fees in respect of any of the matters in List II
Source: Jin (2009, p. 73). 
  
The third pillar: India’s system of intergovernmental transfers 
The vertical and horizontal imbalances created by the expenditure and revenue assignments 
are recognized and addressed through a complex system of intergovernmental transfers. 
There are several channels through which intergovernmental transfers are received by sub-
national governments. The first channel is the tax share in centrally levied taxes, which are 
determined and transferred by the Finance Commission of the Union. The recommendations 
and transfer formulas of the Finance Commission have relied heavily on per capita income 
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to measure the backwardness of the recipient states. The second channel is through the 
Central Planning Commission in the form of grants and loans. In general, these plan grants 
and loans were initially project oriented, but they were later based on a formula known as 
the Gadgil formula, which has been modified several times, with a proportionate mix of 
grants and loans. These grants and loans can be roughly classified into two categories: 
central assistance and additional central assistance. The third channel is through central 
ministries, under which a broad range of development programs known as Centrally 
Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) are initiated by the Union and implemented by various 
departments of the states. The number of CSS types is estimated at over 400 and cover a 
variety of development tasks like poverty alleviation, family planning, irrigation, and 
education.  
Among the three main components of gross devolution, shares in central taxes and central 
grants follow a similar increasing trend, while loans from the Union have decreased 
significantly since 2003 to less than 10 percent of total gross devolution. Because of the 
pressure to lower fiscal deficits and debts, the Union cut back on loans. Grants from the 
Union, non-plan schemes, CSSs, and state plan schemes account for more than 90 percent 
of sub-national revenues. The multiplicity of transfer channels, together with lack of 
coordination between the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission, undermines 
the fiscal autonomy and fiscal discipline of sub-national governments thereby weakening 
accountability.8  
The fourth pillar: India’s regulation of sub-national borrowing 
Sub-national borrowing is permitted in India, though with restrictions. If a sub-national 
government owes money to the Union, then the sub-national government must receive 
permission from the central government to borrow. Since all states have outstanding debts 
to the Union, the central government has effective control over sub-national borrowing. 
Besides borrowing in the form of plan loans from the Union, subnational governments can 
issue domestic bonds and contract policy loans from international organizations. Since 
2003, central loans have declined, and states have resorted to more market borrowings, 
which involve heavy interest payments at the state level. Like China, the states of India 
have substantial “off the books” and hidden borrowings through SOEs. 
India’s intergovernmental fiscal system is characterized by an absence of substantial fiscal 
resources available to the third-tier of local government, unclear expenditure assignments 
between the central and state governments, transfer multiplicity without coordination, high 
transfer dependence, and excessive sub-national borrowing. 
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Performance of China and India’s Intergovernmental Systems 
Below we evaluate the performance of China and India’s intergovernmental fiscal systems 
using standard criteria, namely, the decentralization ratio, which is defined as the share of 
sub-national government expenditures (revenues) in general government expenditures 
(revenues). In addition, we calculate the average rates of expenditure and revenue 
decentralization, where the average rate of expenditure (revenue) decentralization is the 
average share of provincial (state) expenditures (revenues) in consolidated government 
expenditures (revenues). This new measure accounts for the fact that countries differ in the 
number of sub-national governments. Failing to account for the number of sub-national 
governments can make the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization misleading. 
We also examine the evolution of interregional variation in the average rates of expenditure 
and revenue decentralization in China and India during the period 1985 through 2005. We 
measure interregional variation in average rates of expenditure (revenue) decentralization 
using the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation of the decentralization 
ratio divided by the mean of the ratio, multiplied by 100. 
Table 5 shows that China and India’s expenditure decentralization ratios, averaged over the 
1993-2007 period, are 70.6 percent and 42.3 percent, respectively. Based on a sample of 78 
countries, the time-averaged decentralization ratio of China ranks first and that of India 
seventh. As a non-federal country, China’s decentralization ratio substantially exceeds the 
average for federal countries of 35.5 percent. In terms of the number of government tiers, 
China and India rank well above the sample average of 3.6 and the federal average of 3.8. 
Figure 2 depicts the conventional measure of expenditure decentralization. In both 
countries, the degree of decentralization has been growing. Over the 21 year period, 
expenditure decentralization in China and India increased by 23 percent and 43 percent, 
respectively. The figure also shows that China’s expenditure system is substantially more 
decentralized than that of India. Keep in mind that China decentralized expenditures to local 
governments; while India’s system is generally “stuck” at the state level, with some notable 
exceptions. The difference in decentralization ratios between the two countries remains 
relatively constant over time.
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Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007 
                     
Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio  Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio 
    country 3/  (In Percent)     country 3/  (In Percent) 
               
                  
China 5/ 0 0 5 70.6  Uganda 0 0 6 20.8 
Colombia 0 0 3 63.1  Belgium 1 1 4 20.8 
Canada 1 1 4 57.6  Romania 0 0 3 19.8 
Switzerland 1 1 3 48.6  Albania 0 0 3 19.0 
Denmark 1 0 3 46.1  Peru 0 0 4 17.7 
United States 1 1 4 45.5  Czech Republic 1 0 3 17.3 
India 5/ 0 1 5 42.3  Bulgaria 0 0 4 16.2 
Russian Federation 0 1 4 40.8  France 1 0 4 15.7 
Argentina 0 1 3 39.8  Serbia 0 0 na 14.6 
Australia 1 1 3 39.2  Turkey 1 0 4 13.3 
Germany 1 1 4 38.7  Zimbabwe 0 0 5 13.2 
Kazakhstan 0 0 4 36.8  Malaysia 0 1 3 12.9 
Brazil 0 1 4 35.8  Slovenia 1 0 2 12.6 
Finland 1 0 3 33.8  Luxembourg 1 0 3 11.9 
South Africa 0 0 3 33.3  Israel 1 0 3 11.5 
Belarus 0 0 4 33.3  Slovak Republic 1 0 4 10.2 
Sweden 1 0 3 32.7  Chile 1 0 4 9.8 
Spain 1 1 4 32.2  Croatia 0 0 3 9.3 
Tajikistan 0 0 4 30.8  New Zealand 1 0 3 8.3 
Norway 1 0 3 30.0  Portugal 1 0 4 8.2 
(To be continued on next page) 
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Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007 (Continued) 
                     
Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio  Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio 
    country 3/  (In Percent)     country 3/  (In Percent) 
               
               
Austria 1 1 4 29.1  Paraguay 0 0 3 8.1 
Ukraine 0 0 4 26.5  Morocco 0 0 3 6.3 
Azerbaijan 0 0 3 25.7  Armenia 0 0 3 6.2 
Mexico 1 1 3 25.3  El Salvador 0 0 3 5.9 
Netherlands 1 0 3 24.9  Thailand 0 0 5 5.6 
Ethiopia 0 1 5 24.1  Mauritius 0 0 3 5.4 
Georgia 0 0 4 24.1  Guatemala 0 0 4 5.1 
Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 4 23.9  Greece 6/ 1 0 4.5 4.6 
Iceland 1 0 2 23.6  Kenya 0 0 6 4.3 
Latvia 0 0 3 23.1  Fiji 0 0 5 3.7 
Italy 1 0 4 22.7  Costa Rica 0 0 4 3.5 
Lithuania 0 0 3 22.6  Iran 0 0 4 3.4 
Poland 1 0 3 22.6  Cyprus 0 0 3 3.1 
Moldova 0 0 3 22.4  Dominican Republic 0 0 3 3.0 
Mongolia 0 0 n.a. 22.3  Nicaragua 0 0 4 2.9 
Ireland 1 0 3 22.2  Panama 0 0 4 2.5 
United Kingdom 1 0 4 22.1  Congo, Republic of 0 0 4 2.4 
(To be continued on next page) 
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Table 5. Expenditure Decentralization Ratios for Selected Countries, Averages for the Period 1993-2007 (Continued) 
                     
Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio  Country 1/ OECD 2/ Federal Tiers 4/ Ratio
    country 3/  (In Percent)     country 3/  (In Percent)
              
              
Estonia 1 0 3 21.5  Lesotho 0 0 3 1.7
Bolivia 0 0 4 21.4  Malta 0 0 3 1.2
Hungary 1 0 3 21.4  Jamaica 0 0 2 1.0
                     
Overall average                3.6 20.8
OECD average                3.4 24.5
Federal average                3.8 35.5
         
 
Sources: The decentralization ratio is calculated based on data from the IMF's Government Finance Statistics. The federation dummy and 
the number of government tiers are derived from Treisman (2008).  The country selection is based on data availability. 
Notes:  
1/ Countries are ranked by their expenditure decentralization ratio, which is defined as the share of sub-national expenditures in general 
government expenditures. 
2/ Number of tiers including the central level. 
3/ Dummy variable taking on a value of one if the country is an OECD member. 
4/ Dummy variable taking on a value of one if the country is classified as Federal by Treisman (2008). 
5/ Data averaged over the period 1993-2005. 
6/ 4.5 because eparchies (i.e., administrative subdivisions of prefectures) exist in some prefectures. 
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Figure 2: Expenditure Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent) 
      Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in       
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.  
 
Figure 3: Average Expenditure Decentralization in China and India, 1985-2005 
(percent) 
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Panel (b): Population Weighted 













    Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in 
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Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in 
China and Budget documents of the Government of India. 
  
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the average rate of expenditure decentralization in China and 
India for the period 1985 through 2005. While India’s average rate of expenditure 
decentralization is relatively stable during this period, China’s average rate of expenditure 
decentralization is growing, and China is slightly more decentralized than India. Panels (b) 
and (c) of the figure show population weighted and gross regional product (GRP) weighted 
average rates of expenditure decentralization. According to the weighted averages, India is 
slightly more decentralized than China, suggesting that the more populous and higher 
income states of India are more decentralized than those of China. In addition, the weighted 
averages show that China and India’s rates of expenditure decentralization are converging. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the coefficient of variation for the average rate of 
expenditure decentralization in China and India between 1985 and 2005. Three patterns are 
apparent in this figure. First, as suggested by the value of the coefficient of variation during 
this period, which never drops below 50 in the case of China and 80 in the case of India, 
there is considerable interregional variation in the rate of expenditure decentralization in 
both China and India. Second, there is considerably more interregional variation in 
expenditure decentralization in India relative to China. Third, the coefficient of variation in 
the average rate of expenditure decentralization is trending up over time. 
23
Jin et al.: The Evolution of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India:  A C
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2011
THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
  
 




Figure 5 presents the evolution of the conventional revenue decentralization ratio for the 
period 1985 to 2005. In line with our earlier findings, we observe a substantial drop in 
China’s revenue decentralization ratio in the first few years after the 1994 TSS reforms. 
Eventually, in 2005, China’s revenue decentralization ratio settles down to a rate of 48 
percent. In contrast, India’s revenue decentralization ratio has been increasing steadily from 
37 percent in 1985 to 48 percent in 2005. 
Figure 6 shows the average rate of revenue decentralization in China and India between 
1985 and 2005. Using the unweighted average, the rates of revenue decentralization for 
China and India are remarkably similar over time. Turning to the population and GRP 
weighted averages, we see the same pattern as in the case of the average rate of expenditure 
decentralization, namely India’s weighted-average rates of revenue decentralization are 
slightly greater than those of China, but they are converging over time. 
Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the coefficient of variation (CV) in the average rate of 
revenue decentralization for China and India between 1985 and 2005. The CV of the 
average rates of revenue decentralization for China and India are remarkably similar during 
this period. Likewise, there is considerable interregional variation in the rate of revenue 





















THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
 
PAGE 576 2011   JOURNAL OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE ON EMERGING MARKETS  ●   WWW.ICAINSTITUTE.ORG
 
Figure 5: Revenue Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent) 
Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in 
China and Budget documents of the Government of India.  
 
Figure 6: Average Revenue Decentralization in China and India, 1985–2005 (percent) 
Panel (a): Unweighted 
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Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in 
China and Budget documents of the Government of India. 
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Sources: Based on data from the National Statistics Bureau and Ministry of Finance in 
China and Budget documents of the Government of India. 
 
Conclusion 
There are remarkable similarities in the design and performance of China and India’s 
intergovernmental fiscal systems. Both countries have highly decentralized expenditures 
assignments and highly centralized revenue assignments. These assignments create a 
vertical fiscal gap, which can only be addressed by substantial intergovernmental transfers 
leading to transfer dependency. Finally, there is considerable off the books and hidden 
borrowing by sub-national governments in both countries, despite prohibitions against 
borrowing without the permission of the central government.  
In the case of China, the assignment of redistributive programs, like social security and 
unemployment insurance, to local governments does not appear to be appropriate in the 
long run, unless these assignments are accompanied by central government transfers. In the 
case of India, expenditure assignments are often concurrent rather than exclusive. This 
arrangement creates coordination issues and makes it difficult for citizens to know which 
level of government is accountable for poor performance. We also see that there is 
considerable and growing interregional variation in the rate of expenditure decentralization 
in China and India. This development may point to the need for equalization transfers in 
both countries; otherwise, growing interregional disparities in the quantity and quality of 
local government service provision may threaten national cohesion. 
The starkest difference in the fiscal systems of China and India is that expenditure 
decentralization in China focuses on the third-tier of local government and skips the 
second-tier of government. In contrast, India’s fiscal system is “stuck” at the second tier of 
27
Jin et al.: The Evolution of Fiscal Decentralization in China and India:  A C
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2011
THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN CHINA AND INDIA:  
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 
  
 




government, with some notable exceptions like the states of West Bengal, Karnataka, and 
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